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NOTES
THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973: FOCUSING THE
DEFINITION OF A HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUAL
In 1973, Congress passed the first major civil rights legislation
for handicapped individuals-the Rehabilitation Act.' According
to section 504 of the Act, "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped
individual... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be... sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."'2 The statute defines a handicapped
individual as a person who:
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially lim-
its one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such
an impairment.3
Section 504 raises two problems of interpretation. First, how
should "handicapped individual" be defined? Second, what pre-
cisely constitutes "otherwise qualified"?
The second question has been the subject of numerous articles
and much litigation.4 Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
5
the first Supreme Court case involving the Rehabilitation Act, con-
cerned the extent to which an employer was required to accommo-
date a handicapped individual. Commentators have proposed sug-
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982 & Supp. HI 1985).
2. Id. § 794.
3. Id. § 706(8)(B).
4. See, e.g., Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
401 (1984); Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HAv. L. REV. 997 (1984).
5. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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gested guidelines, including cost-benefit analyses,6 for assessing the
accommodation requirement.
In contrast, until recently, relatively few courts have addressed
the preliminary question of what constitutes a handicap. Litigation
involving section 504 often does not address the question because
the employer stipulates that the plaintiff is handicapped. Indeed,
fourteen years passed before the Supreme Court first addressed
the fundamental issue of interpreting the definition of handi-
capped individual."
Courts deciding the question of whether a plaintiff is "handi-
capped" have reached varied results. For example, courts have
considered oversensitivity to cigarette smoke,9 transvestism, 10 and
contagious diseases11 as handicaps. Yet individuals who are afraid
of heights,' 2 lefthanded, 3 cross-eyed, 4 or have cerebral palsy1 5
may not be handicapped. The line distinguishing the handicapped
individual from others is, at best, blurred."l
6. Janis, A Unified Theory for Section 504 Employment Discrimination Analysis:
Equivalent Cost-Based Standards for "Otherwise Qualified" and "Reasonable Accommo-
dation," 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 63 (1986).
7. See, e.g., Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 228 (3d Cir. 1983) (defend-
ants agreed that plaintiff with hearing aid was handicapped); Fitzgerald v. Green Valley
Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130, 1132-33 (D. Iowa 1984) (employer conceded that
plaintiff with hemiplegia, nocturnal epilepsy, and dyslexia was handicapped).
8. The Supreme Court first interpreted the definition of handicapped individual under
the Rehabilitation Act in School Board v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). See infra text
accompanying notes 96-102.
9. Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
10. Blackwell v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 639 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1986).
11. School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
12. Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
13. de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir. 1986).
14. Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
15. Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Soc'y, 625 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
16. In the majority of cases brought under section 503 or 504, courts have determined or
accepted that the following may be handicaps: tuberculosis (School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct.
1123 (1987)); blindness (Norcross v. Sneed, 573 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 755
F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1985) (blind in one eye); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d
Cir. 1977), appeal dismissed, 614 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1980)); mental disorders (Doe v. New
York Univ., 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181 (D. Md. 1985)
(manic depression); Swann v. Walters, 620 F. Supp. 741 (D.D.C. 1984) (paranoid schizophre-
nia)). But see Guerriero v. Schultz, 557 F. Supp. 511 (D.D.C. 1983) (foreign service officer's
need for therapy was not a handicap); spodylitis (Sisson v. Helms, 751 F.2d 991 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846 (1985)); heart conditions (Bento v. I.T.O. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 731
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This Note analyzes the first question posed by section 504: How
should a handicap be defined? The Note examines congressional
intent, the regulations, and the courts' interpretations. The Note
also analyzes particularly troublesome, unresolved issues in defin-
ing handicaps, including voluntary impairments, conditions that
threaten danger to others, and the propensity for defining and in-
terpreting "handicap" so expansively as to make it meaningless.
The Note concludes by proposing a reasoned interpretation of the
definition of handicapped. This proposed interpretation empha-
(D.R.I. 1984); Smithberg v. Merico, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 80 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Bey v. Bolger, 540
F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982)); multiple sclerosis (Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo.,
658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981)); permanent osteoarthritis of knee (Guinn v. Bolger, 598 F.
Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1984)); epilepsy (Kelley v. Bechtel Power Corp., 633 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.
Fla. 1986); Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Iowa
1984)); dyslexia (Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educ. Agency, 589 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D.
Iowa 1984)); history of drug use (Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (partici-
pants in methodone maintenance programs are handicapped individuals)); hypersensitivity
to cigarette smoke (Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982). But cf.
GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979) (nonsmokers
harmed by cigarette smoke not handicapped as a matter of law under state law granting
handicapped persons the right to full use of public facilities)); transvestism (Blackwell v.
United States Dept. of Treasury, 639 F. Supp. 289 (D.D.C. 1986)); loss of index finger
(Smith v. United States Navy, 573 F. Supp. 1361 (S.D. Fla. 1983)); alcoholism (Simpson v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1980); Tinch v. Walters, 573 F. Supp. 346
(E.D. Tenn. 1983); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978)); congenital defects
(Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986)); paraplegic (Simon v. St. Louis
County, 563 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Mo. 1983)); loss of hearing (Southeastern Community College
v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Crane v. Lewis, 551 F. Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1982); Doss v. General
Motors Corp., 478 F. Supp. 139 (C.D. Ill. 1979)); and back abnormality (E.E. Black, Ltd. v.
Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980)).
Courts are less inclined to rule that a condition is not a handicap for purposes of section
504. For example, in Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 745-46 (C.D. Cal. 1984),
the court could find only one case in which a plaintiff was not handicapped. The case cited
was GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979). Courts have
found the following conditions not to be handicaps: excessive weight (Tudyman v. United
Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984)); nonsmoking status (GASP v. Mecklenburg
County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E. 2d 477 (1979)); cerebral palsy discernible only by the use
of sophisticated diagnosis equipment (Pridemore v. Rural Legal Aid Society, 625 F. Supp.
1180 (S.D. Ohio 1985)); lefthandedness (de la Torres v. Bolger, 781 F.2d 1134 (5th Cir.
1986)); strombosis (Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985));
knee injury (Alderson v. Postmaster General, 598 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (sustained
while fleeing from vicious dog when delivering mail)); visual impairment (Padilla v. Topeka,
238 Kan. 218, 708 P.2d 543 (1985) (vision with glasses was 20/20)); and acrophobia (Forrisi
v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986)).
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sizes the underlying policy of section 504, namely, providing pro-
tection against societal stigmas about handicapped individuals.
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act in 1973 to establish vo-
cational rehabilitation services for handicapped individuals. I" The
first three titles of the Act concern vocational rehabilitation ser-
vices,"s research and training,19 and special federal responsibili-
ties.20 Title IV sets up the National Council on the Handicapped.21
The fifth title, simply called "Miscellaneous Provisions," includes
four sections. Section 50122 prohibits discrimination against the
handicapped by the federal government. Section 50223 addresses
the reduction of barriers to the mobility of handicapped individu-
als in public places. Section 50324 forbids discrimination against
the handicapped by government contractors. Finally, section 504,25
the primary focus of this Note, forbids federally funded programs
from discriminating against handicapped individuals.
The original definition in the 1973 Act described a handicapped
individual as one who has "a physical or mental disability which
for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial handicap
to employment and [who] can reasonably be expected to benefit in
terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services pro-
vided pursuant to subchapters I and III of this chapter." 26 Evi-
dently, Congress originally intended the definition to focus exclu-
sively on employability. The proper scope of section 504 in the
original act is unknown. The House and Senate Committee Re-
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
18. Id. §8 720-751.
19. Id. §§ 760-762a.
20. Id. 88 770-777f.
21. Id. §8 780-785.
22. Id. § 791.
23. Id. § 792.
24. Id. § 793.
25. Id. § 794.
26. Id. § 706(7) (amended 1974).
[Vol. 30:149
THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
ports concerning the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 include no men-
tion of the breadth of section 504.
In 1974, Congress amended the Act and broadened the definition
of handicapped individual under section 504.28 According to the
amended definition, a handicapped individual is a person who has
a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is
regarded as having such an impairment.2 9 A legislative history ac-
companied the new definition of section 504.30 The history empha-
sized that the definition of handicapped individual was not limited
to employment or to the individual's potential benefit from voca-
tional rehabilitation services under titles I and III of the Act."
Rather, Congress intended to establish a "broad government policy
that programs receiving Federal financial assistance shall be oper-
ated without discrimination on the basis of handicap.
3 2
Congress passed a second amendment to the definition in 1978.83
For purposes of sections 503 and 504, the amended definition of
"handicapped individual" excludes
any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current
use of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing
the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by rea-
son of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a
direct threat to property or the safety of others.
34
27. See H.R. REP. No. 93-244, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); HR. REP. No. 93-500, 93d Cong.
1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2143; S. REP. No. 93-318,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2076, 2076.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
29. Id.
30. S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 6373.
31. Id. at 6388.
32. Id. at 6390.
33. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122(a)(6), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984-85 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §
706(8)(B) (1982)).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
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THE REGULATIONS
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, instructed
by Congress to implement regulations, 5 had an unusually difficult
job. 6 The Act offered no guidelines about what constituted unlaw-
ful discrimination. Although the legislative history of the 1974
amendments offered some guidance in clarifying the intended
scope of section 504, important decisions remained for the Depart-
ment. Specifically, the Department had two formidable tasks: de-
fining "handicapped individual" more precisely to supplement the
statute's definition and deciding whether drug and alcohol addicts,
poor people, elderly people, and homosexuals should be included
as handicapped individuals. Consequently, the HEW took three
years to promulgate section 504 regulations.3
In the final regulations, the Department defines "physical im-
pairment" as follows: "Any physiological disorder or condition, cos-
metic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of
the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special
sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular;
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin;
and endocrine . . . ."9 A "mental impairment" is "any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disa-
bilities. '40 Finally, the regulations define "a major life activity" as
"functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,
35. S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
N-ws 6373, 6391. Congress emphasized the importance of consistent agency regulations.
Congress delegated responsibility to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to
coordinate section 504 regulations because of the Department's experience with problems of
handicapped people and other types of discrimination. Id.
36. See generally R. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVwL RIGHTS 60-120 (1984) (descrip-
tion of HEW's efforts in writing the section 504 regulations); Engebretson, Administrative
Action to End Discrimination Based on Handicap: HEW's Section 504 Regulation, 16
HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 59 (1979) (examination of the drafting of regulations under section 504).
37. R. SCOTCH, supra note 36, at 59.
38. In 1974, Congress urged HEW to complete section 504 regulations before the end of
1974. "Delay beyond this point would be most unfortunate since the Act... was enacted
over one year ago . . . ." S. REP. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6373, 6391.
39. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1987).
40. Id. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(B).
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walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working. '41
The appendix to the regulations clarifies the meaning of "handi-
capped" under the Act.42 The appendix analyzes the three parts of
the statutory and regulatory definition. The first part includes in-
dividuals who, in fact, have physical or mental impairments that
substantially limit one or more major life activities. In developing
this definition, the Department did not list all mental or physical
impairments covered by the Act "because of the difficulty of ensur-
ing the comprehensiveness of any such list. '43
The appendix states next that an impairment is not a handicap
unless it substantially limits one or more major life activities. The
Department offered no insight when it defined the phrase "sub-
stantially limits," however, noting that "a definition of this term
[was] [not] possible at [that] time. '44 The Department also ex-
amined whether the definition of handicapped was unreasonably
broad.45 A number of comments suggested that the Act cover only
"traditional" handicaps. 46 The Department rejected this definition
because it did not allow for the appropriate flexibility. Neverthe-
less, the Department stated that it would direct its enforcement
efforts against discrimination toward people with "severe handi-
caps that were the focus of concern in the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.,,27
Next, the Department stressed that the definition of handi-
capped applies only to physical and mental handicaps. This char-
acterization specifically excludes environmental, cultural, and
economic disadvantage, as well as prison records, age, or homosex-
41. Id. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii).
42. Id. pt. 84, app. A at 344.
43. Id. The appendix lists some examples of diseases and conditions covered by the Act:
"orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular
dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional
illness, and... drug addiction and alcoholism." Id.
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uality.48 The Department also clarified its intention that physical
and mental impairments include specific learning disabilities.49
Part two of the statutory and regulatory definition includes peo-
ple with a record of an impairment. This part was intended to ap-
ply to people with a history of a handicapping condition, as well as
to people who have been inappropriately classified as having such a
condition. Examples of this classification include people "with his-
tories of mental or emotional illness, heart disease, or cancer," or
"persons who have been misclassified as mentally retarded."" °
The third part of the definition includes "any person who is re-
garded as having a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more major life activities." 51 The appendix gives
examples of this category as people with limps, disfiguring scars,
and people who are treated as if they were handicapped.2
In formulating the regulatory definition, the Department ad-
dressed the issue of drug abusers and alcoholics. Many of the com-
ments advocated excluding drug abusers and alcoholics from the
act altogether a.5 However, the Department relied on a legal opinion
from the Attorney General stating that drug addiction and alcohol-
ism constituted "physical or mental impairments. '54 Accordingly,
drug abusers and alcoholics are handicapped if the impairment
substantially limits one or more of their major life activities. The
Attorney General's opinion, coupled with "a medical and legal con-
sensus that alcoholism and drug addiction are diseases, 55 con-
vinced the Department to classify drug abusers and alcoholics as
handicapped individuals. This classification means that an em-
ployer may consider alcoholism and drug abuse under the second
issue-determining whether the individual is "otherwise qualified."
48. Id. The Department noted that the regulations would include as "handicapped" a
person with any of the excluded characteristics who also had a physical or mental impair-
ment. Id.
49. Id. Specific learning disabilities, defined by section 602 of the Education of the Hand-
icapped Act, include "perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dys-
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Consequently, if the employer shows that the addiction or alcohol-
ism prevents adequate job performance, he has the right to refuse
to hire the handicapped individual.56
INTERPRETATION BY THE COURTS
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii was
the first court to analyze thoroughly the question of what consti-
tutes a handicap. In E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall,5 7 an employer
brought suit under section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. Section
503 requires government contractors to "take affirmative action to
employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped indi-
viduals." '58 Because "handicapped" is defined identically in sec-
tions 503 and 504,59 the interpretation of the Hawaii court is
relevant.
George Crosby applied to work as an apprentice carpenter for
E.E. Black, Ltd. ("Black"), a general construction contractor. A
pre-employment physical required by Black revealed that Crosby
had a partially sacrolized transitional vertebra, a congenital back
anomaly. Black refused to hire Crosby based on the diagnosis.2
Crosby filed a complaint alleging that Black had refused to hire
him because of the back abnormality. 1 After an investigation, the
United States Department of Labor issued a complaint charging
Black with violation of section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act.62 The
administrative law judge found that Crosby had an impairment
but one that did not substantially limit a major life activity. 3 The
judge stated that to prove a substantial limitation, the impairment
56. Id. at 346.
57. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1982).
59. The definition of handicapped individual given in 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1982) applies to
§§ 503 and 504. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6)(B) (1982).
60. 497 F. Supp. at 1091. A second physician examined Crosby several weeks later and
concluded that Crosby's condition would not hinder his performance as an apprentice car-
penter. Id. at 1091-92. Although Black received a letter including the recommendation of
the second physician, Crosby was not hired. Id. at 1092.
61. Id. Crosby filed with the State of Hawaii Department of Labor, which referred his
complaint to the United States Department of Labor. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1093.
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must have "impeded activities relevant to many or most jobs.""
Crosby, therefore, was not a handicapped individual for the pur-
poses of section 503.65
The Department of Labor appealed to the Assistant Secretary of
Labor." The Assistant Secretary found the requirement that the
impairment "impede activities relevant to many or most jobs" too
narrow. Rather, a plaintiff must only prove that the impairment
excluded the type of employment that the individual "[was] cur-
rently capable of performing. 6 7 Because the impairment pre-
vented Crosby from working for the employer he desired, Crosby
qualified as a handicapped individual under section 503.68
Black filed for judicial review of the Assistant Secretary's deci-
sion.6 9 The district court concluded that an "impairment" was
"any condition which weakens, diminishes, restricts, or otherwise
damages an individual's health or physical or mental activity. 70
Emphasizing that Congress intended a broad definition, the court
denied Black's challenge that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague.71
The court then considered the appropriate definition of "sub-
stantially limited." The court believed the administrative law
judge's interpretation too restrictive because it failed to consider
the particular individual. 2 On the other hand, the court found the
Assistant Secretary's interpretation too broad. By failing to ade-
quately stress the word "substantial," the Assistant Secretary's in-
terpretation potentially defined a handicap as any disqualification
for one job.73 The court declined to focus on the impairment in the
abstract, but instead emphasized the individual job seeker: "This
necessitates a case-by-case determination of whether the impair-
ment or perceived impairment of a rejected, qualified job seeker,
constitutes, for that individual, a substantial handicap to employ-
64. Id. at 1094.
65. Id. at 1093.
66. Id. at 1094.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1095.
69. Id. at 1095-96.
70. Id. at 1098.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1099.
73. Id.
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ment." 4 The criteria for a case-by-case determination included the
number and types of jobs from which the impaired individual was
disqualified, the geographical area to which the applicant had rea-
sonable access, and the individual's job expectations and training.7 5
The court next applied its standards to the facts. First, Crosby
was indeed impaired. Black perceived that Crosby's back problem
"weakened, diminished, and restricted [his] physical activity. '76
Second, the impairment substantially limited a major life activity.
Crosby's goal was to become a journeyman, which required numer-
ous hours of carpentry practice. The court presumed that all em-
ployers offering the same job would use the same requirement.
Crosby would therefore be substantially limited in his goal of be-
coming a journeyman. Thus, the disqualification from the job with
Black constituted a substantial handicap generally to the type of
employment sought by Crosby.77
Tudyman v. United Airlines
In Tudyman v. United Airlines,8 the United States District
Court for the Central District of California was the next court to
analyze at any length the definition of handicapped. Tudyman ap-
plied to United Airlines for a job as a flight attendant. United Air-
lines rejected him because he weighed fifteen pounds more than
the maximum weight allowed for a man of his height. His excess
weight was due to a body-building program. United Airlines moved
for summary judgment because, inter alia, Tudyman was not a
handicapped individual for the purposes of section 504. The court
agreed.9
Tudyman argued that the maximum weight requirements sub-
stantially limited a major life activity, namely, his ability to be em-
ployed by United Airlines."0 The court acknowledged that the reg-
ulations include "work" as a major life activity. Furthermore, the
court stressed that the definition should not be applied so narrowly
74. Id. at 1100.
75. Id. at 1100-01.
76. Id. at 1102 (emphasis omitted).
77. Id.
78. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
79. Id. at 740-41.
80. Id. at 744-45.
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as to require that an employee be excluded from all employment in
order to prove that the impairment substantially limited a major
life activity.81 Nevertheless, the court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the inability to be hired by one employer is sufficient to
prove that an impairment has substantially limited a major life ac-
tivity. "A person who exceeded the maximum weight for a United
flight attendant because he is an avid body builder is not limited in
a major life activity-he is only prevented from having a single
job."8 2
The court also considered the cause of Tudyman's alleged im-
pairment. His extra weight was not the result of a disorder men-
tioned in the regulations, but was a voluntary condition. The court
distinguished between a self-initiated body-building program and
an involuntary weight problem, and explained that section 504 did
not protect voluntary impairments.8 3
The court thus held that, as a matter of law, Tudyman's weight
did not qualify as a handicap under section 504. Tudyman did not
have a physical impairment, was not substantially limited in a ma-
jor life activity, and was not perceived as such. If any person who
fails to meet a job qualification is classified as a handicapped indi-
vidual, the court reasoned, the term "handicapped" would become
"a meaningless phrase. '84
Jasany v. United States Postal Service
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit faced
the same issue of defining a "handicapped individual" in Jasany v.
United States Postal Service. 5 Jasany, a postal worker who suf-
fered from a mild case of strabismus, or crossed eyes 86 filed a com-
plaint alleging that the Postal Service fired him because he was
handicapped.
As an employee for the Postal Service, Jasany operated a mail
sorting machine. Jasany developed eye strain, headaches, and ex-
81. Id.
82. Id. at 746.
83. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 112-25 (related discussion of voluntariness as a
factor in defining handicaps).
84. 608 F. Supp. at 746.
85. 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
86. Id. at 1247.
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cessive tearing. A doctor attributed these symptoms to the combi-
nation of the visual work required to operate the machine and the
strabismus. Jasany refused to operate the machine and was fired.81
The district court held that, although Jasany was a handicapped
individual, he nevertheless was not a "qualified handicapped indi-
vidual. '18 Jasany appealed, arguing that section 504 required the
Postal Service to make reasonable accommodations. 9
The court of appeals disagreed with the district court's finding
that Jasany was a handicapped individual for the purposes of sec-
tion 504.90 The district court held that, because the strabismus im-
paired Jasany's ability to work on the machine, the impairment
substantially limited a major life activity, namely, work.9 1 The
Sixth Circuit rejected this conclusion, applying the E.E. Black,
Ltd. v. Marshall2 logic that "an impairment that interfered with
an individual's ability to do a particular job, but did not signifi-
cantly decrease that individual's ability to obtain satisfactory em-
ployment otherwise, was not substantially limiting within the
meaning of the statute. 9 3 Because Jasany's condition affected only
his ability to operate the sorting machine, it did not substantially
limit his ability to be employed generally. Jasany therefore failed
to show that he was a handicapped individual for the purposes of
the Act.9 4
The court of appeals in Jasany also outlined the proper burden
of proof in similar cases. Under section 504, the plaintiff has the
burden of establishing a prima facie case by proving the existence
of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
Once a prima facie case is presented, the defendant bears the bur-
den of proof to demonstrate that reasonable accommodation is not
87. Id. Because Jasany refused to operate the machine, his supervisor ordered him to take
a Fitness for Duty Examination. The results of the examination disqualified him for future
employment as a machine operator.
88. Id. at 1248.
89. Id. at 1251.
90. Id. at 1250.
91. Id. at 1248.
92. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980). See supra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
93. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 1248.
94. Id. at 1250. The court noted that both before his eye strain and after his firing, Jasany
was active in school, work, sports, and "all other normal daily activities of every kind what-
soever without limitation." Id. at 1247.
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feasible. Thus, a court need not address the second issue of reason-
able accommodation unless the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case that he is a handicapped individual. 5
School Board v. Arline
A recent United States Supreme Court case involving a Rehabil-
itation Act issue was School Board v. Arline." In Arline, the Su-
preme Court first addressed the issue of what constitutes a "handi-
capped individual" under section 504.97 The issue in Arline was
whether a teacher with tuberculosis was a handicapped individual
under section 504.8 The school board argued that, although a con-
tagious disease may be an impairment, Arline was not dismissed
because she was impaired but because the tuberculosis threatened
the health of others.9 9 Rejecting the school board's distinction be-
tween the contagious effects of a disease and the disease's physical
effects on a claimant, the Court held that tuberculosis was a
handicap. 100
The Court first concluded that because tuberculosis is a physio-
logical condition affecting the respiratory system, Arline had a
physical impairment as defined by the federal regulations. In addi-
tion, because Arline was hospitalized for the tuberculosis, the im-
pairment substantially limited one or more life activities, as re-
95. Id. at 1249-50.
96. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
97. Arline was the fourth case involving the Rehabilitation Act before the Supreme
Court. The first case was Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979),
which involved the second question posed by section 504: what constitutes reasonable ac-
commodation? The plaintiff's handicap was undisputed. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,
465 U.S. 624 (1984), was the second Supreme Court case involving the Rehabilitation Act.
The issue was whether the Act created a private right of action. Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287 (1985), the third Supreme Court case involving the Act, also addressed the duty of
an employer to modify a program to accommodate people with handicaps.
In 1988, the Supreme Court decided Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct. 1372 (1988), a case of
more limited significance. One issue in Traynor was whether a Veterans Administration reg-
ulation, which classified alcoholism as "willful misconduct" for purposes of granting exten-
sions of a limitation period for benefits, violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In a
narrow holding, the Court concluded that the Veterans Administration's definition did not
violate section 504. Id. at 1383.
98. Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1125.
99. Id. at 1130 & n.6.
100. Id. at 1128.
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quired by the regulations. 101 Thus, the Court held that Arline was
a handicapped individual for purposes of section 504.102
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall,103 Tudyman v. United Airlines,104
and Jasany v. United States Postal Service,'-° sensibly sought to
interpret "substantially limits a major life activity" to strike a bal-
ance between requiring only disqualification from one job, at one
extreme, and requiring disqualification for all jobs, at the other ex-
treme. E.E. Black, Ltd. offered the most useful standard by listing
factors to consider in a case-by-case determination of the plaintiff's
employment circumstances.106 School Board v. Arline07 analyzed
another issue: whether the definition of handicapped included con-
tagious disease. Significantly, the Court adopted an expansive defi-
nition of handicapped individual.10 8
Despite the insights provided by these four cases for interpreting
"handicapped individual," many unresolved questions remain.
Some of the more troublesome issues still unanswered include the
voluntary nature of a condition, 10 9 the threat a condition may pose
to others,110 and the problem caused by defining "work" as a major
life activity (the bootstrap problem).1
These three problems, which the next sections of this Note dis-
cuss, reflect an underlying tension: what is the proper balance be-
tween the clear intent of Congress for a broad interpretation of
section 504, on the one hand, and the necessity to impose some
categorical limits on the definition of "handicapped individual," on
the other hand. Courts have struggled to achieve a reasonable bal-
ance by drawing the line to distinguish voluntary from involuntary
101. Id. at 1127.
102. Id.
103. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
104. 608 F. Supp. 739 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
105. 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).
106. 497 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
107. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
108. Id. at 1127.
109. See, e.g., Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746.
110. See, e.g., Arline, 107 S. Ct. at 1128-30.
111. See, e.g., Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746; E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp.
1088, 1099 (D. Haw. 1980).
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conditions, by excluding conditions that threaten danger to other
people, or by including conditions that prevent a person from be-
ing hired by a particular employer. These three distinctions,
though superficially appealing, are not satisfactory as fixed rules
for defining a "handicapped individual."
Voluntary Conditions as Handicaps
Should a line be drawn between voluntary and involuntary con-
ditions? In Tudyman v. United Airlines, the court interpreted the
issue of the voluntariness of a condition as relevant to what consti-
tutes a handicap.112 The court cited Davis v. Bucher" 3 for the pro-
position that drug abuse was a voluntary condition. The court in
Davis held that drug abuse constituted a handicap under section
504 based on HEW's analysis of the issue." 4  Tudyman suggests
that the court in Davis would have used voluntariness as a factor
to show that a condition was not a handicap if the Department had
not expressly categorized drug abuse as a handicap. 5
The court next cited Vickers v. Veterans Administrationn1 as
authority for using voluntariness as a factor. In Vickers, the court
held that an employer was not unlawfully discriminating against
an employee who was oversensitive to cigarette smoke because the
employer made a reasonable effort to accommodate this handi-
cap.11 7 One significant fact in Vickers was that the employee did
not take action to prevent the problem. The employee could have
closed a door or moved his desk to reduce his exposure to smoke." 8
The court in Tudyman improperly interpreted Vickers as sup-
port for using the voluntary nature of a condition as an element
negating the finding of a handicap.1 9 In Vickers, the factor of vol-
untariness was relevant only to the issue of whether the employer
had reasonably accommodated the employee. Significantly, the vol-
112. 608 F. Supp. at 746.
113. 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
114. Id. at 796.
115. See Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746.
116. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
117. Id. at 87, 89. The court in Vickers declined to decide whether the Veterans Adminis-
tration had a duty to the plaintiff.
118. Id. at 89-90.
119. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746.
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untary nature of the plaintiff's condition was not used to deter-
mine whether he was "handicapped." 120 Furthermore, moving a
desk or closing a door were means by which the plaintiff could mit-
igate the effects of the handicap, not indications that the plaintiff
voluntarily chose to be oversensitive to cigarette smoke. Accord-
ingly, the court's use of Vickers as support for the use of voluntari-
ness as a factor in defining a handicap was wholly misplaced.
In an attempt to justify a distinction based on the voluntariness
of a condition, the court in Tudyman made a weak final argument.
Congress amended the Act in 1978 to exclude certain drug and al-
cohol abusers. 121 The amendment reflects congressional intent to
exclude alcoholics and drug abusers who either cannot perform the
duties of the job or threaten property or the safety of others.
Based on the clear language of the statute, therefore, the distinc-
tion is between alcoholics and drug abusers who are able to per-
form the job and pose no danger to others, on the one hand, and
those unable to perform who do pose a danger, on the other hand.
The court, however, interpreted the amendment as distinguish-
ing between voluntary and involuntary impairments: "The 1978
amendment to the Act gives additional indication that § 504 was
not intended to protect those with voluntary 'impairments' from
employment discrimination as it specifically excepted some present
drug and alcohol abusers from the definition of handicapped indi-
vidual.' 1 22 The conclusion reached by the court is clearly incorrect.
Not all alcoholics or drug abusers who can perform a job and pose
no threat of danger, and thus are protected by section 504, are in-
voluntary abusers. Conversely, not all alcoholics or drug abusers
who cannot perform a job and do pose a threat are suffering from a
voluntary condition.
The statutory language does not suggest that those with volun-
tary impairments are unprotected by the Act. Such a distinction is
artificial. For example, although an addiction may cause involun-
tary conduct, an addict has the option of voluntarily seeking help.
The first drink for an alcoholic may be voluntary, the remaining
120. Rather, the fact was significant in the court's discussion of whether the plaintiff was
otherwise qualified. See Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89-90.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 34.
122. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746.
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drinks involuntary. Another example is a person afflicted with
AIDS. The sexual conduct may have been voluntary, but the re-
sulting disease involuntary.
These examples illustrate the difficulties posed by a categorical
exception for "voluntary" handicaps. Such an exception is unsatis-
factory for several reasons. First, some handicaps that may at first
be labeled "voluntary" may not after greater scrutiny be voluntary
at all. Obesity and alcoholism may ostensibly be within the indi-
vidual's power to control. Yet experts regard some forms of alco-
holism123 and obesity124 as diseases over which the individual has
little control.
Second, handicaps that ostensibly seem "involuntary" may in-
deed be within an individual's control.12 For example, epilepsy is
an involuntary handicap, but an individual can control the disease
with medicine. If a person refuses to take medicine, the handicap
is arguably not involuntary, but self-imposed.
Handicaps that Threaten Danger to Others
Another troublesome issue involves impairments that threaten
danger to others. Did Congress intend for dangerous conditions to
be classified as handicaps? Congress amended the Act in 1978 to
exclude from the definition of "handicapped individual" drug
123. Thomas Seessel, executive director of the National Council on Alcoholism, maintains
that "to say alcoholism is voluntary is to stand the definition on its head, because alcohol-
ism is an addiction, a loss of control." Neal, Is Alcoholism a Disease?, 74 A.BA.J. 58, 62
(Feb. 1988). In Traynor v. Turnage, the Supreme Court held that a conclusive presumption
that all alcoholism not motivated by mental illness is willful is not inconsistent with section
504. 108 S. Ct. 1372, 1383 (1988). In supporting its argument, the Court noted authority
contesting the classification of alcoholism as a disease. Even if alcoholism is a disease, the
Court suggested the disease may be willful: "[Elven among many who consider alcoholism a
'disease' to which its victims are genetically predisposed, the consumption of alcohol is not
regarded as wholly involuntary." Id.
124. See Bierman, Obesity, in CEcIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1372-79 (L. Smith & J. Wyn-
gaarden, eds. 1982); see generally Comment, The Rehabilitation Act Of 1973: Protection for
Victims Of Weight Discrimination? 29 UCLA L. REv. 947 (1982) (exploring obesity as a
handicap under the Act).
125. "Individuals suffering from a wide range of disabilities, including heart and lung dis-
ease and diabetes, usually bear some responsibility for their conditions. And the conduct
that can lead to this array of disabilities, particularly dietary and smoking habits, is cer-
tainly no less voluntary than the consumption of alcohol." Traynor v. Turnage, 108 S. Ct.
1372, 1391 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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abusers and alcoholics who threaten danger to others or prop-
erty.126 Yet, classification of all alcoholics and drug abusers as
handicapped individuals makes more sense analytically. Alcoholics
who are unable to keep a job surely have an impairment which
substantially limits a major life activity. An employer has the right
not to hire the category of alcoholics and drug abusers who would
be unable to perform the job or would pose a threat, not because
they are unprotected by anti-discrimination legislation, but be-
cause they are not "otherwise qualified." Indeed, the regulations
adopt this interpretation. 127
The statutory definition, then, puts the burden of proof on the
employer to show that an alcoholic or drug abuser is otherwise
qualified only if the individual can perform the duties of the job
and does not threaten others. If the alcoholic or drug abuser can-
not perform the duties or poses a threat, no prima facie case can
be made that he is even handicapped. Under no circumstances
would the employer have the burden of proof for this category of
individual.
Although such a result may be desirable from an employer's per-
spective, the reasoning is unsound. Surely, dangerous abusers are
at least as handicapped as non-dangerous abusers if their impair-
ment substantially affects a major life activity. Accordingly, the
more logical way to exclude dangerous abusers is to emphasize that
they are not "otherwise qualified."
The 1978 amendment demonstrates Congress's concern for pro-
tecting the safety of other employees and the property of the em-
ployers. A similar concern of the School Board of Nassau County,
Florida led to the Arline litigation. The school board argued that a
contagious disease was not a handicap because it threatened the
126. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). The legislative history indicates that the 1978 amend-
ment was meant to "exclude alcoholics and drug abusers in need of rehabilitation from the
definition of 'handicapped individual.' H. R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7312, 7333-34.
127. In the appendix to the HHS regulations, the agency includes drug addicts and al-
coholics within the definition of handicapped individuals. The concern about alcoholics and
addicts that cannot perform the job and pose a danger to others is consumed under the
"otherwise qualified" issue. "[W]hile an alcoholic or drug addict may not be denied services
or disqualified from employment solely because of his or her condition, the behavioral mani-
festations of the condition may be taken into account in determining whether he or she is
qualified." 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A at 346 (1987).
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health of others. 28 The Supreme Court disagreed: "It would be un-
fair to allow an employer to seize upon the distinction between the
effects of a disease on others and the effects of a disease on a pa-
tient and use that distinction to justify discriminatory
treatment.'
129
The Court therefore properly rejected a categorical exclusion of
all contagious diseases from the Act's definition of handicapped in-
dividual. Rather, if an individual with a contagious disease has an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, he or she
is handicapped. 30
The primary question in the case of an individual with a conta-
gious disease is whether the individual is "otherwise qualified."
Courts must determine the extent to which an employer must
"reasonably accommodate" the individual. Indeed, after determin-
ing that a person with a contagious disease could be a handicapped
individual under section 504, the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the district court to decide if Arline was "otherwise
qualified."'l l
The Arline reasoning should be the guide for analysis of all
handicaps that may threaten danger to others. Denying protection
to a person with an impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities because the condition may threaten
others results in adding a third prong to the statutory definition:
(1) an impairment (2) that substantially limits a major life activity
(3) but does not threaten the danger of others or property.
The addition of this third prong is exactly what Congress did
with respect to drug abusers and alcoholics in the 1978 amend-
ment. Public policy, however, favors the right of an employer to
refuse to hire dangerous individuals because the individual cannot
perform the job, not because the dangerous individual is not
"handicapped." Viewing the danger-to-others question as an other-
wise qualified issue, then, rather than adding a third prong limiting
the definition of handicap, makes more sense.
128. School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1128 (1987).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1129-30.
131. See id. at 1130-32.
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A person posing a significant risk of spreading a contagious dis-
ease will likely not be otherwise qualified for a job. The result for
the plaintiff would be the same as if the limitation were part of the
definition of handicapped. Yet, the burden of proof would be dis-
tributed in a way that is more consistent with the intent of the
Act. If the person with a contagious disease showed that he was
handicapped, the employer would have to prove that it would not
be feasible to accommodate the individual. Although seemingly
harsh from the employer's perspective, denying the "handicapped"
classification to an employee who may pose a risk to others under-
mines a fundamental purpose of the Act-preventing stigmas
about handicaps. To force an employee with AIDS, for example, to
prove that he poses no threat to others in order to even make a
prima facie case that he is handicapped flies in the face of the pol-
icy behind section 504. As Arline makes clear:
Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and
fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment. Few as-
pects of a handicap give rise to the same level of public fear and
misapprehension as contagiousness. . . .The Act is carefully
structured to replace such reflexive reactions ... with actions
based on reasoned and medically sound judgments.3 2
If a person with an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity is not hired due to a putative threat of danger to
others, the employer should bear the burden of showing the threat.
The Bootstrap Dilemma
A third troublesome issue is posed by the definition of "major
life activities." According to the regulations, major life activities
"means functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working. ' 13 3 Arguably, if an employee fired or refused to hire the
plaintiff based on an impairment, such an impairment, by defini-
tion, substantially limited a major life activity-the ability to work
132. Id. at 1129.
133. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1987).
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for that employer. Any impairment, therefore, that is the basis of
adverse action by an employer, is a handicap.
Courts have commented about this bootstrapping problem. In
Tudyman v. United Airlines, for example, the court cautioned
that if the failure to qualify for a job constitutes a limitation on a
major life activity, then "anyone who failed to obtain a job because
of a single requirement which may not be essential to the job
would become a handicapped individual because the employer
would thus be viewing the applicant's failure as a handicap."1"4
The court noted that such an interpretation would make the term
handicapped "a meaningless phrase."' 3 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted
the same problem in Forrisi v. Bowen. 36 An employee suffering
from acrophobia argued that he was fired in violation of section
504. 13 The court warned against classifying the employee as a
handicapped individual solely on the grounds that he could not
perform the duties of a particular job. Although his impairment
obviously limited a major life activity, the plaintiff could not pre-
vail simply because his acrophobia limited-indeed, halted-his
ability to work for the employer who fired him. 38
In oral argument before the Supreme Court in School Board v.
Arline,3 9 the Solicitor General pointed out the problem, which he
labeled as a "circular argument which lifts itself by its boot-
straps."' 40 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan dismissed the
argument in a footnote: "Congress plainly intended the Act to
cover persons with a physical or mental impairment (whether ac-
tual, past, or perceived) that substantially limited one's ability to
work." 4 1
Brennan's retort to the bootstrap morass hardly solves the prob-
lem. The dispute is not whether Congress intended the Act to
cover impaired individuals who were limited in their ability to
134. Tudyman, 608 F. Supp. at 746.
135. Id.
136. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986).
137. Id. at 933.
138. Id. at 934-35.
139. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
140. Id. at 1129 n.10.
141. Id.
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work. The issue instead is whether an individual who loses a job
opportunity because he cannot meet a particular demand of the
job is, by definition, impaired and thus handicapped.
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall'42 posed a solution to the problem.
"Work" constitutes a major life activity, but work must be care-
fully defined. If a court construes "work" as one particular job, the
statute would be too broad.143 If this definition were accepted, the
Act could cover a waitress offered a job in nine restaurants but
excluded from a tenth because of her allergy to food at the tenth.
On the other hand, if work was defined as employability generally,
the statute would be too narrow. 4 4 The Act would unfairly exclude
from its protection an attorney who was not hired by a law firm
because of an impairment, but who could be hired to be a taxi
driver or a nurse.
The compromise explained in Black defined work as employ-
ment appropriate for an individual. An analysis of whether a per-
son's impairment constitutes a substantial limitation to employ-
ment for that individual requires a case-by-case determination.
The court suggested a list of factors that should be examined to
make a fair judgment.145 First, a court should consider the number
and types of jobs from which the impaired individual is disquali-
fied. 146 Assuming that employers of similar jobs require the same
qualifications as the defendant, a court should assess the category
of jobs for which a plaintiff does not qualify.
Second, a court should consider the geographical region to which
the applicant has reasonable access. 147 A plaintiff's opportunities
could be limited despite the availability of a similar job 1000 miles
away. If the rejecting employer is the only one in the geographical
area offering the position, the requirement is more limiting than if
many other employers offer the position without the requirement.
A final factor to consider is the training and job qualifications of
the individual.148 An individual may be qualified both to teach
142. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
143. Id. at 1099.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1100.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1101.
148. Id.
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math and to be a librarian, but may have an impairment which
substantially limits his opportunities to teach math. Such a person
is not "substantially limited" if a librarian job is available. The
person qualified as a chemist, however, is substantially limited
even though he might find a job as a truck driver.
A REASONED DEFINITION OF HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUAL
An analysis of whether an individual is handicapped begins as
follows: 149 (1)(A) Does the plaintiff have an impairment? (1)(B)
Does the impairment substantially limit a major life activity? (2)
Does the plaintiff have a record of such an impairment? (3) Is the
plaintiff regarded as having such an impairment? If the answer to
(1)(A) and (1)(B), or (2), or (3), is yes, then the plaintiff is a handi-
capped individual under section 504. The court can then proceed
to the "otherwise qualified" issue.
The preliminary analysis simply follows the statutory definition.
The key to a well-reasoned interpretation is a careful examination
of the meaning of "impairment" and "substantially limits a major
life activity." A sensitivity about societal attitudes toward the
handicapped individual must underlie the analysis.
Physical or Mental Impairment
Deciding whether a plaintiff actually has an impairment, has a
record of an impairment, or is perceived as having an impairment
requires a clear notion of what "impairment" means. One option is
to define impairment as any condition that substantially limits one
of a individual's major life activities. If Congress intended to define
impairment in this manner, the phrase "which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities" would be unnec-
essary. This definition is therefore unsatisfactory because it is re-
dundant and strips the term "impairment" of any substantive
meaning.
149. This analysis is based on the language of 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B)(1982). For an analytic
approach to interpreting the definition of handicapped individual that emphasizes a distinc-
tion between actual and perceived handicaps, see Comment, What's a Handicap Anyway?
Analyzing Handicap Claims Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Analogous State
Statutes, 22 WILLAMEmrm L. REV. 529 (1986).
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Another option is to define impairment by comparing the alleged
condition with the regulation's list of physical and mental impair-
ments. For example, if the plaintiff has an impairment that is a
"physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or an-
atomical loss affecting one or more of the body systems," 150 he
would qualify as having a physical impairment. The Supreme
Court recently used this analysis in School Board v. Arline.15 ' This
definition, however, gives no meaning to the word "impaired." To
be classified as having an impairment under the regulations, any
"condition" affecting a "body system" would suffice. Mild near-
sightedness, chubbiness, or a cold would all fit neatly into such a
broad definition. Few people would not be impaired. Surely, Con-
gress did not intend the Act to categorize nearly everyone as
impaired.
Another option is to define impairment as any job qualification
that a person seeking to be or to remain employed does not pos-
sess. For example, a short person applies to play professional bas-
ketball. Because the condition of being short keeps the person
from being hired, the condition is an impairment.
This interpretation is also untenable. To define physical charac-
teristics as impairments because they fail to meet an employer's
criteria distorts the common-sense meaning of "impairment." The
court in E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall52 adopted this erroneous in-
terpretation by using the example of an employer who required all
employees to have curly hair. Applying the Court's definition, the
rejected job applicant with straight hair is "impaired."""3 The
Court went on to note that an individual who ran the 100 yard
dash in 27 seconds and did not qualify to be a running back for the
Dallas Cowboys was also "impaired." This individual would be un-
protected by the Act, however, because he was not "otherwise
qualified.' 1 54
The better approach is to say that having straight hair or run-
ning the 100 yard dash in 27 seconds are not impairments at all.
150. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1987).
151. 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1127 (1987). The Court reasoned that because the tuberculosis af-
fected Arline's respiratory system, Arline therefore had a physical impairment.
152. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
153. Id. at 1100.
154. Id.
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This approach ironically adopts the definition of impairment set
forth in Black. An impairment is "any condition which weakens,
diminishes, restricts, or otherwise damages an individual's health
or physical or mental activity."'15 5 This definition is a more reason-
able interpretation of impairment than the regulation's definition
covering "any condition which affects.' 5 6 "Affects" simply means
"acts upon.' 157 The Black definition, however, more precisely uses
the verbs "weakens, diminishes, restricts, or damages." Had the
court in Black properly applied its own definition to its examples,
the straight-haired and slow runner applicants would not be im-
paired under section 504.
Substantial Limitation
A careful definition of "substantially limits one or more of a per-
son's major life activities" involves the consideration of several fac-
tors. First, courts should emphasize the characteristics of a par-
ticular individual, not the abstract question of whether an impair-
ment limits an activity. The criteria Black adopts aids in deter-
mining whether the impairment substantially limits activity for
that individual. 5 '
Second, courts should stress the adverb "substantially." Both
Congress'5 9 and the agencies'6" have underscored the importance of
155. Id. at 1098.
156. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(1987).
157. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 35 (1987).
158. 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1100-01 (D. Haw. 1980). See supra notes 142-48 and accompany-
ing text.
159. In 1979, a Senate bill was proposed to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of a handicap. The bill would have extended
federal protection to handicapped individuals seeking employment or advancement in the
private sector. The definition of handicapped individual proposed by the Rehabilitation Act
was the same as this Senate bill. Although the bill was not passed, the discussion of the bill
is relevant to congressional intent regarding handicapped individuals under the Act. Accord-
ing to the Senate Report,
"impairment," as used in the definition of "handicap," does not extend to indi-
viduals with only minor or very temporary impairments or to those who do not
have any condition that is stigmatizing or that otherwise more generally limits
employment or some other major life activity. Rather the term is intended to
apply only to more long-term or permanent, or recurring conditions.
S. 446, S. REP. No. 316, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1979).
160. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A at 345 (1987).
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emphasis on "substantially." The limit on the plaintiff's ability to
perform an activity must be a major limitation. If "substantially"
is taken seriously as a limitation on the definition of handicapped,
courts cannot justify classifying temporary illnesses, minor aller-
gies, or oversensitivity to cigarette smoke as handicaps in the ab-
sence of unusual circumstances.
The definition of handicapped individual must not include all
illnesses found in a medical encyclopedia. Dr. David Wechsler, psy-
chologist and inventor of intelligence tests, proposed that the great
majority of human differences in physical and mental attributes
fall within a normal range.16' According to his theory, out of a
thousand individuals, only two will vary greatly from the interme-
diate group of 998. Wechsler's findings are endorsed by Dr. Earl
McBride, a physician who systematically evaluated human func-
tional disability.162 McBride argued that despite wide ranges in
physical and mental attributes,
the mind-body, viewed as a whole . . . has built-in features of
safety, compensation, and repair that mitigate the effects of
these wide variations. Long experience with the severely dis-
abled has revealed that in a general way the capacities and po-
tentials of the individual human being have been underesti-
mated. Man is incredibly tough.163
A handicapped person, then, is an individual who falls outside of
a reasonable range of human differences. A court, therefore, should
not view a handicap as an illness, although an illness may indeed
be handicapping. Rather, the concept of handicap combines both
the physical or mental impairment of the individual with the re-
sulting social status of the affected individual. Social status was a
clear concern of the Rehabilitation Act, and courts cannot craft a
proper interpretation of the definition of handicapped without
considering this aspect of a handicap.
161. McBride, The Classic Concept of Disability, 221 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS AND RE-
LATED RESEARCH 3, 7 (Aug. 1987).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 8.
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Societal Stigma
Understanding the underlying goal of section 504 is fundamental
to a reasoned definition of "handicapped." Despite the lack of ex-
planation within the statute, the 1974 legislative history empha-
sized the need to integrate disabled persons into society.1 4 Section
504 and Title VT'65 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act contain similar
language forbidding discrimination.6 6 The Civil Rights Act took
aim at the history of societal stigma about blacks. Section 504,
similarly, focused on precluding societal stigma about handicaps.6 7
Historically, disabled people have been subjected to cruel jokes,
false myths, and general rejection by society. The "cripple" label is
a product of fear, misconception, and ignorance.
68
An important article written in the 1960s stressed social stigma
as the element that distinguishes a "disabled" person from the
164. Individuals with handicaps are all too often excluded from schools and educa-
tional programs, barred from employment or are underemployed because of
archaic attitudes and laws, denied access to transportation, buildings, and
housing because of architectural barriers and lack of planning, and are discrim-
inated against by public laws which frequently exclude individuals with handi-
caps or fail to establish appropriate enforcement mechanisms.
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6373, 6400. Senator Humphrey applauded the efforts of the Department of HEW in
promulgating regulations implementing section 504. "Certain kinds of discrimination have
become so engrained in our society they almost enjoy respectability. The regulations will
mean making an extra effort to share-to share with handicapped Americans the opportuni-
ties for an education, transportation, housing, health care, and jobs that other Americans
take for granted." 123 CONG. REc. 13,515 (1977).
165. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6373, 6390.
166. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states: "No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
Section 504 is also modeled from Title XI of the Education Amendments of 1972 which
stated, "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .. " 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
167. Congressional concern about irrational societal attitudes is implicit in its definition
of "handicapped individual" applicable to section 504. The definition expressly includes
people whom society erroneously labels as handicapped. Thus, the social judgment about
the individual may be more determinative of whether an individual qualifies as "handi-
capped" under section 504 than a medical opinion confirming that a handicap indeed exists.
168. McBride, supra note 161, at 5.
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"handicapped" person.6 9 A disability is defined by a medical diag-
nosis. A handicap, on the other hand, is the status of a disabled
person in society. Defining a disability is relatively objective: a doc-
tor examines a patient to find the percentage of restriction result-
ing from an impairment. On the other hand, a handicap is the
product of a societal value system and cannot be defined without
determining the extent to which a society accepts or rejects the
condition. 170
Deciding whether a person is handicapped involves more than an
objective finding. Theoretically, a disability, the mental and physi-
cal limitations caused by an impairment, should correspond to the
social handicap, the way society interprets the disability. Yet, so-
cial stigma often poses a more significant obstacle than the actual
impairment.17 1
Dr. Earl McBride emphasized a similar point.1 72 The definition
of disability "denotes the position of the individual in society."' 7 3
Determining who is physically and mentally fit, or "normal," in-
volves value judgments influenced by social prejudice. The term
"cripple" illustrates the effect of value judgments and social
prejudice. People have historically used the word "cripple" with
contempt, believing that the devil possessed handicapped individu-
als. 7 4 Unfortunately, the stigma associated with "cripple" still
lingers.
Although substitute words with less negative connotations such
as "handicapped" or "disabled" are widely used today, the social
stigma that attaches to impairments is still a problem. Indeed,
overcoming social prejudice may be a greater challenge for the
handicapped individual than adjusting to the actual physical or
mental restrictions resulting from the handicap. The degree to
which the handicapped individual becomes integrated into society
is largely a function of social factors. 75




172. McBride, supra note 161, at 5.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 5-6.
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The Supreme Court recently emphasized congressional intent in
protecting the handicapped from social prejudice. In School Board
v. Arline,7 8 the Court pointed out the expanded definition of
handicapped individual of the 1974 amendment to the Rehabilita-
tion Act. According to the Court, the protection of persons who
have a record of or are regarded as having an impairment demon-
strated congressional concern about the effects of stigma. By en-
suring that the definition covered not only individuals with actual
impairments, but also individuals who were perceived as impaired,
"Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and
fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the
physical limitations that flow from actual impairment. ' 177 The
Court concluded that the plaintiff, who had tuberculosis, was
handicapped because she had an impairment that substantially
limited a major life activity. Additionally, the plaintiff's contagious
disease was the basis for public fear and social prejudice. 178
Understanding that section 504 attempted to dispel societal
stigma associated with handicaps broadens and narrows the defini-
tion of "handicapped individual." Preventing prejudice extends
the definition to cover persons with contagious diseases, a category
which arguably was not originally intended by Congress in enact-
ing the Rehabilitation Act. 7 9 The goal of preventing prejudice also
narrows the definition to exclude people temporarily afflicted with
injury or illness, or those suffering from minor afflictions. Such
people are simply not the focus of section 504.
CONCLUSION
A reasoned interpretation of the definition of handicapped indi-
vidual first requires an examination of whether the individual is
impaired, has a record of being impaired, or is perceived as im-
paired. Impairment, best defined as "any condition which weakens,
diminishes, or otherwise damages," excludes conditions that may
not fit a job description, but are not otherwise outside the usual
range of human differences.
176. 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987).
177. Id. at 1129.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 1132-34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Second, the impairment must substantially limit one or more
major life activities. The focus should be on whether the impair-
ment limits the activity for the particular individual, balancing his
or her qualifications, locations, and opportunities. "Substantially"
demands emphasis to prevent the definition from becoming trivial.
Finally, courts must examine the stigma attached to the impair-
ment. Section 504 is designed to fight the prejudice that reflects
fear and ignorance about handicaps. Oversensitivity to cigarette
smoke or the common cold do not arouse the same misapprehen-
sions as AIDS or blindness. Deciding who is handicapped under
the Act is not complete until one scrutinizes social attitudes and
effects.
Anna Phipps Engh
